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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF
"THE OPEN COURT."
The Data of experience are perceptions.
Reality is the sum total of all that is.
Truth is the conformity of cognition to reality.
[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to
be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it
would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.
At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact
everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called Wirk-
lichkeit in German, derived from wirken, to take effect. Reality is
not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effective-
ness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not
only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence
and its manifestation are not two different things ; both are one.
The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also
untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose ex-
istence is not manifested i. e. , existence without reality ; Sein
ohne Wirklichkeit—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]
.Science is the search for truth.
The nature of science is the economy of thought. (Mach.)
Economy of thought is possible through application of the
laws of form to thought.
Knowledge is the possession of certain truths.
[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with
which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge.
The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowl-
edge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vague-
ness, errors, and misconceptions.
The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over
nature.]
Monism is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-
existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual,
as a oart of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the
All.
Religion is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.
[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of The
Open Couvt, but all definitions that have been presented are in
strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as
"man's union with the All " (taking the definition from the Lu-
theran Catechism ' ' Religion ist der Bund des Meuschen mit Gott
durchGott," and replacing the Word God by the more compre-
hensive word The All). The editor has defined Religion as
"man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das
AUgefiihl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see
foot-note page 965); as " man's conception of the world that serves
him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]
Morals are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.
[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or
preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou jus-
tify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not
persoual; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly
his authority is that of religion. If t were not so, all his good
precepts would have no foundation: they would hover in the air
like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]
Ethics is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must,
and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison
with the All.
Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on
earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms
of existence.
Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All,
i. e'., those which enhance progress, and morally bad are those
which are not in harmony with the All, i. e. , those which retard or
prevent progress.
[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has
naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its
origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for
truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But
all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such
is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that sci-
ence as such is a sham.
It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not
contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion
and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of
either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human
mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between
religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed
and re-adjusted.
The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for
the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of pro-
gress for both.]
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THE PRICE OF ETERNAL YOUTH.
An unnecessary dread of death prevails among
mankind, a dread which is due only to a morbid imagi-
nation. Men who are not afraid to suffer pain, are
sometimes found to shrink from the mere idea of haz-
arding their lives. It is not the agonies of death of
which they are afraid, nor is it the state after death,
the eternal rest of being dead, which appears appall-
ing, but it is the moment of dying,—that it is which
they dread most. It is the passage from life to death,
the passage through that gate,
"Which every man would fain go slinking by—
Where fancy doth herself to self-born pangs compel,
Around whose na row mouth flame all the fires of hell."
This dread is unnecessary ; it is founded upon
wrong ideas of death ; it is based on errors that can
and must be dispelled.
We learned in school that the old physicists believed
in a horror vacui and explained from it certain natural
processes. This horror vacui, as we now know, is an
error, just as much as the dread of death.
It is a fact that dying persons are, as a rule, under
the impression that they have passed through a crisis
for improvement, for the agony is overcome and pain
has ceased. The feeling is due to a blunting of pur
sensory nerves and organs, and must be compared to
the pleasant sensation which a fatigued person enjoys
when quietl}' falling asleep. In sleep the sense-im-
pressions become gradually dulled and sweet visions
of dreams rise before our mental eye, until the light
slumber passes into a profound sleep where all con-
sciousness ceases. There is no more reason for the
dread of death than for horror at Ijang down to sleep.
A sage of antiquity said: "Why should we fear
death ? Death is not here, so long as we are here.
And if death is here, we are no longer."
We must meet death in the sense that the Stoic
philosopher on the throne prepared himself to accept
all the gifts of nature. He said : "Everything harmo-
nizes with me which is harmonious to thee, O Cosmos.
Nothing for me is too early nor too late which is in due
time for thee. Everything is fruit to me which th}-
seasons bring, O Nature. From thee are all things, in
thee are all things, to thee all things return."
Death is a natural phenomenon not less than birth ;
and the agonies of death are generally less painful than
the throes of birth. The problem of death is closely in-
terwoven with the problem of birth, so that you can-
not disentangle the one without unraveling the other.
Birth is, as our scientists teach, the growth of an
individual beyond its individuality. It is the nature of
living beings to live and to grow. The lowest kind of
animals do not die ; they grow and divide and thus
they multiply. The amoeba may die from violence, it
can be crushed to death by your foot; it may starve
from lack of food ; but it knows no natural death.
The animalcules which you can observe to-day are the
very same creatures that lived millenniums ago, long
before man appeared upon earth. Immortality is their
natural state.
How did it happen that death came into the world
of life, into the realm of immortality? Is death the
meed of sin that is due to a violation of nature's laws?
Or if it is a natural process, pray what is it?
Death came into the world as the brother of birth,
and death became necessarj^ when birth with its re-
juvenescent power lifted organic life one step higher
in its evolutionary career, so as to allow a constantly
renewed progress, so as to create innumerable fresh
beginnings and to give new starts to life, new pos-
sibilities to the development of life.
Birth is growth beyond the limit of individuality.
Thus the creature born is the very same creature, as
its mother and its father, just as much as the two amta;-
bas are the very same substance the mother amoeba
was before her division. But the creature born has
one great advantage over its parents. It can com-
mence life over again. It is identical with its parents,
but it is its parents in a state so little fixed and formed,
so young, so unimpaired, so pure, like the fresh dew
that glitters in the morning-sun, that it can make a
new start, it can travel new paths and can climb to
higher planes, which seemed inaccessible to its an-
cestors.
Not only men but all creatures are naturally one-
sided ; they develop to be one sided through their
occupations and their experiences, and become more
and more so the longer they live. What can life wish
for better, than to be allowed to drop again and again the
fresh prejudices constantly acquired, which we even
admit may be justified in the men that hold them. But
we know that they would become injurious if mankind
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clung to them forever. It is for the best of humanity, that
it can drop the errors which are perhaps, as we freely
grant, partial truths. Humanity must gain not only
renewed vigor, but also virginity in life and in love,
in hopes, and in ideal aspirations.
This is done through the introduction of birth into
the empire of life. And this makes it possible that life
is always young, that it is virgin-like, and endowed
with renewed courage as well as interest.
Is the boon of a constant rejuvenescence of the race
through birth bought too dearly by the surrender of
our individual existence to death? Certainly not, if
the good features of individuals can be transmitted to
their descendants, if their death is only a partial ob-
literation of hfe, where it has lost the capacity of
progressive endeavor, where impartiality of judgment
is gone, so that we no longer can see the light
when a new morn dawns with greater and higher pos-
sibilities.
Nature does not intend to ossify life, it makes life
plastic, and in order to preserve the plasticity, the
vigor, and virginity of Hfe, nature endowed life not
only with immortality that through the act of birth
makes life extend and grow beyond the limit of indi-
vidual existence, but at the same time it bestowed upon
it, through the same means of birth, that wonderful
desirable gift, eternal youth, without which immor-
tality would become an unbearable burden.
What would life be, what would immortality mean,
if it were not identical with eternal youth ? If human-
ity must buy eternal youth at the cost of death—at the
cost of the death of individuals, it is certainly not
bought too dearly.
Death then is a necessity ; but serious though the
idea of death must make our thoughts, it is not terrible;
awful though it may be, it must not overawe us. Death
is like the northern sunset. The evening twilight in-
dicates the rise of a new morn. The nocturnal dark-
ness of the end of life is the harbinger of a new day,
clothed in eternal youth. So closely interwoven is
death with immortality !
The lesson that death teaches let me express in the
words of our poet :
" So live that when thy summons comes to join
The able tha
To the pale realms of shade, where each shall take
His chamber in the silent halls of death,
Thou go not, like the quarry slave at night
Scourged to his dungeon, but, sustained and soothed
By an unfaltering trust, approach thy grave
Like one who wraps the drapery of his couch
About him, and lies down to pleasant dreams."
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MAN AND ANIMAL.
BY PROFESSOR MAX MULLER.
There seems to be some truth after all in the old
English saying that familiarity breeds contempt, or, at
all events, indifference.
There is nothing we are more familiar with than
our own language. We learn it, we hardly know how.
While reading, writing, arithmetic, and all the rest,
are not acquired without considerable effort, and are
often forgotten again in later life, we learn our most
difficult lesson, namely, speaking, without any con-
scious effort, and, however old we may grow, we never
forget it again.
But I ask you, Have you ever tried to find out what
this language of ours really is ; how it came to us ;
when and where it was made ; and what it was made of ?
Of course, you will all say, we learnt our language
from our father and mother, or rather from our mother
and father. Yes, but from whom did they learn it ?
From their parents, and these parents again from
their parents, and thus ad infinitum.
Even this simple answer, which is by no means
quite correct, is full of import, and ought to ha\je been
taken to heart far more seriously than it seems to have
been by certain philosophers who maintain that parrots
and other animals also learn to sp'eak, exactly as chil-
dren learn to speak, and that therefore language is
after all nothing so very wonderful, and cannot be said
to form an impassable barrier between man and beast.
It is quite true that children nowa-days do neither
create their own language nor inherit it. Speaking
any language is not an acquired habit that descends
from father to son. The necessary conditions of speech,
however, exist in man and in man only; for if these
necessary conditions were present in the parrot as
well as in man, it would indeed be strange, to say no
more, that there should never have been a Farrotese
language, and that no parrot should ever have learnt
his language from his parents, and they from theirs,
and thus ad infinitum. A parrot never learns to speak,
as little as a child would ever learn to fly. These facts
are so simple and so obvious that it is difficult to un-
derstand how they can ever have been disregarded by
philosophers. And yet to the present day, most thought-
ful writers go on repeating the old fallacy, that a par-
rot learns to say 'poor Polly,' just as a child learns to
say 'poor Polly.'
To put it on the lowest ground, do these philoso-
phers not see that every child of man is the descend-
ant of an animal that could frame language, and has
framed language ; while every parrot, and every other
animal is the descendant of an animal that never
framed a language of its own? When a parrot learns
to speak, it is simply tempted to utter certain sounds,
in more or less close imitation of English or French,
by such rewards as sugar and other sweetmeats, or by
severe punishments on the part of its keepers. As to
any parrot inventing a language of its own, and teach-
ing that language to its young, not even Mr. Romanes
would believe in such a miracle.
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It is therefore not enough to sa)' that we learn our
language from our parents, and they from their par-
ents, and thus a(f infinitum. That would be a very
lazy way of handling our problem. This retrogression
ad infinitum would be a mere confession of ignorance,
and such a confession, though it is very honorable
when we know that we cannot know, cannot be tol-
erated except in cases where we know also why we can-
not know.
When we see the history, or, as it is now the
passion to call it, the evolution of language, we cannot
help admitting that there must have been some kind
of beginning. A language, such as English, for in-
stance, does not tumble down from the sky ; and, even
if it did, it would have to be picked up, and to pick
up a language, as you know, is not a very easy task,
particularl}' for a person supposed to be dumb and
without any idea of what language is meant for. In
former times, as it seemed to be impossible to account
for language as a piece of human workmanship, it was
readily admitted that it was of divine workmanship,
that it reall}' had tumbled down from the sky in some
way or Other, and that curiously enough man alone of
all animals then living upon earth had been able to
pick it up.
But when languages began to be more carefully
examined, traces of human workmanship became more
and more visible, and at last the question could no
longer be pushed aside, how language was made, and
why man alone of all living beings should have come
into possession of it.
Now I ask, If language is that which, as a matter
of fact, distinguishes man from all other animals, is it
not disgraceful that we should be so careless as not to
attempt to find out what language is, and why we, and
we alone of all animals, enjoy the' privilege of speech?
I know quite well that attempts have been made again
and again to show that language is not the distinguish-
ing characteristic of man, and that animals also, though
they have never yet spoken, possess the faculty of
speech, and may in time begin to speak. Even Kant
seems to have indulged in the hope that the chimpan-
zee might some day begin to speak. But if faculty
means originally facility, or that which enables us to
do a thing, surely it is not too much to ask, why hith-
erto no animal should ever have cultivated that gift ; why
no animal should ever have said, 'I am an animal,'
or, ' I am an ape.' Mr. Romanes, in his recent work
on 'Mental Evolution in Man,' has done his very best
to throw a bridge over the gulf that separates all ani-
mals from man, namely, language ; and if he has failed
in showing how human language could have arisen
fjom animal utterances, I doubt whether anj'body else
\\\\\ ever lead that forlorn hope again.
It is easv enough to show that animals communi-
cate; but this is a fact which has never been doubted.
Dogs who growl and bark leave no doubt in the mint!
of other dogs, or cats, or even of man, of .what they
mean. But growling and barking are not language,
nor do they even contain the elements of language.
All names are concepts, and to say that we think in
concepts is only another way of saying that we think
in class-names. Mr. Romanes admits this fully; in
fact the very words I have used are his own words
(1. c, p. 22, note). But has he been able to discover
an)' traces or germs of language, or what he calls 'in-
tellectual symbolism,' in any animal known to us, and
more particularly in that animal from which he thinks
we are more immediately descended ? Evidently not.
'Anthropoid apes,' he says (p. 364), 'are the most in-
telligent, and, therefore, if specially trained, would
probably display greater aptitude in the matter of
sign-making than is to be met with in any other kind
of brute.' 'But,' he continues, 'I do not press this
point. What I now refer to is the fact that the
existing species of anthropoid apes are very few in
number, and appear to be all on the high road to
extinction. Moreover, it is certain that none of these
existing species can have been the progenitor of man,
and, lastly, it is equally certain that the extinct
species (or genus) which did give origin to man must
have differed in several important respects from any
of its existing allies. In the first place, it must have
been more social in habits; and, in the next place, it
was probably more vociferous than the orang, the
gorilla, or the chimpanzee.'
Against such arguments it seems to me that even
the gods would fight in vain. We are told that man
is descended from some kind of anthropoid ape. We
answer that all anthropoid apes, known to us, are
neither social nor vociferous. And we are told that
in that case man must be derived from an extinct ape
who differed from all known apes, and was both social
and vociferous. Surely, if this is a scientific argu-
ment, scientific arguments would in future rank very
low indeed.
I know of no book which has proved more clearly
that language forms an impassable barrier between
man and beast than the book lately published by Mr.
Romanes on the 'Origin of Human Faculty,' though
his object was the very opposite. Taking that point
therefore for granted, it seems to me disgraceful that
in our general system of education, and even of
elementary education, no place should have been
found as )'et for the Science of Language, and that a
single child should be allowed to grow up, without
knowing the worth and value of his most precious
inheritance, without knowing what language is ; lan-
guage, which alone distinguishes him from all other
animals ; language, which alone makes man man ; Ian-
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guage, which has made him the lord of nature, and has
restored to him the consciousness of his own true Self.
And here I must guard at once against an outcry
that is sure to be raised. It will be said that all
these arguments are inspired by an ill-disguised pride,
and arise from a wish to claim a higher position for
man than for other animals. We are told that we
ought to be more humble, and love our neighbors
and venerate our ancestors, even though they were
hairy apes. I plead ' Not guilty ' to all such charges.
By suggesting motives, any discussion may be
poisoned, but such suggestions have really nothing
whatever to do with the question which we are dis-
cussing. If it could be proved by irrefragable
evidence that only a himdred years back all our
ancestors were hairy and speechless, that would not
make the slightest difference in our argument. On
the contrary, it would only enhance our admiration
of language, which, whether in one or in a hundred
centuries, could have wrought such a marvelous
change. It would only make it more incumbent on
us to find out what language really is, that it should
have produced, not only a new species of animal, the
homo sapiens, but an entirely new world. That
language has raised man into an entirely new atmo-
sphere, an intellectual atmosphere which no other
animal can breathe, is admitted on all sides.
Is it not disgraceful, then, I ask once more—is it
not disgraceful that we should pass through life with-
out attempting to know what that atmosphere really is
from which we draw our best intellectual life ? No
one is considered educated without a knowledge of
writing, reading, and arithmetic. To me it seems that
no one should call himself educated who does not
know what language is, and how it came to be what
it is.
At first sight all we seem to be able to say of lan-
guage is that it is wonderful, that it passes all under-
standing, or, as some people would say, that it is
something supernatural and miraculous. That certain
vibrations of air which we produce by various emis-
sions of our breath should represent to us and to others
all that has ever passed through our mind, all we have
ever seen or heard or felt, all that passes before us in
the countless works of nature, and all that passes with-
in us in our endless feelings, our imaginings, and our
thoughts, is marvelous indeed. In fact, next to the
great miracle of existence there is no greater miracle
than this translation of all existence into human speech
and human thought.
But, as with all true miracles, so with this, our first
duty is to try to interpret it, because then only will it
reveal to us all that it was meant to reveal. And with
regard to the miracle wrought by language, nothing is
really more miraculous than its simplicity. It is gen-
erally supposed that the philosophy of language is a
subject far beyond the reach of ordinary minds. I
should be sorry to suppose that there were any minds
which could not take in the simple lessons of the
Science of Language. We never know anything truly,
unless we can make it as clear as daylight to the com-
monest understanding. Every one of us starts from
the level of the ordinary understanding, and however
far we may advance, unless he has lost the thread of
his own knowledge, that is, unless he has allowed his
own mind to get raveled, tangled, and knotted, he
ought to be able to lead others step by step to the
same eminence which he has reached himself.
In no science is this more easy than in the Science
of Language. It is difficult to teach a man music who
cannot play a single instrument. But we all play at
least one language, and can test the teachings of the
Science of Language by a reference to our own lan-
guage.
I shall try therefore to show you what the Science
of Language has achieved, by taking my illustrations
chiefly from a language which you all know—from Eng-
lish. And though I cannot in a few lectures attempt
to give you more than the A, B, C of our science, still
even that A, B, C may be useful, and may possibly en-
courage some of you to pay more attention to the study
of so familiar, and yet so little explored a subject as
our language is. It has indeed many lessons to teach
us, many mysteries to reveal to us, and there is in it
more work to do for any one who wishes to do useful
work, than in any other science which I know of.
When we are told that the English language con-
sists of about 250,000 words, we are no doubt stag-
gered, and do not know how such a number or signs
could have arisen, and how they can all be kept in our
memory, each in its own place. But this large number
of words is really an accumulation of many centuries,
and nothing like that number could have been kept
alive, except through the influence of literature.
Now literature, or, at least, a written literature, is
a mere accident. Let us try, therefore, to realize what
a language would be which possesses as yet no litera-
ture, and, therefore, no literary standard. Such lan-
guages still exist, and we find them generally full of
dialectic variety. They vary as spoken colloquially in
each family ; they vary still more as spoken in different
clans and colonies. In both these forms, as colloquial
and as dialectic, they are full of what we may call
slang,—expressions started by the whims of individ-
uals, but often retained, and admitted after a time into
more general use.
The first beginning of a settled form of speech is
made at public gatherings, where a language must be
used that is intelligible to persons belonging to different
families and coming from distant settlements. This
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public language, which is soon adopted for sacred
poetry also, for popular legends, and for legal enact-
ments, becomes in time what is called the sacred, the
literary, or the classical dialect. But it does not ab-
sorb the whole life of a language. On the contrar)',
each language runs on in its natural channels of col-
loquial speech and dialect and slang, and supplies from
time to time new material to the classical dialect.
What thus takes place before our very eyes in
illiterate languages, must have taken place in all lan-
guages, and we can see the same forces at work, even
now, in such highly cultivated literary forms of speech
as English.
There is one kind of English which is spoken in
parliament, in the pulpit, and in the courts of law,
which may be called the public, the ordinary, and rec-
ognized English.
The r(7//^(/«/<7/ English, as used by educated people,
differs but slightly from this parliamentary English,
though it admits greater freedom of construction, and
a more familiar phraseologj'.
The literary English again requires still greater
grammatical accuracy, and admits a number of uncom-
mon, poetical, and even antiquated expressions which
would sound strange in ordinary conversation.
The dialectic English is by no means extinct. The
peasants in every part of England and Scotland and
Ireland, though they understand a sermon in church,
and read their newspaper, both of which are written
in literary English, continue to speak their own lan-
guage among themselves,—a language full of ancient
and curious expressions which often throw much light
on the history of classical English. These dialects
have of late been most carefully collected, and this is
a branch of study in which everybody, if only he has
a well-trained ear, is able to render most valuable as-
sistance.
Lastly, in discussing special subjects, we are driven
to use a large number of technical, scientific, foreign,
and even slang expressions, many of which are quite
unintelligible to the ordinary speaker.
It is these technical, scientific, foreign, and slang
terms which swell our dictionaries to such an enor-
mous size. We are told that the new Oxford Dic-
tionary will contain a quarter of a million of words.
Does any one of us know 250,000 English words? I
doubt it. It is extraordinary how many words this
small brain of ours will hold, but there are limits to
everything. In China a j'oung man receives his first
or second class in examination, according to the num-
ber of words he can read or write. But in order to
obtain the place of an imperial historian, a candidate
is not required to know more than 9,000. We do more
than this. Most of us can read Shakespeare's plays,
and in order to do that, we must know about 15,000
words. But though we understand most of these words
(there are only about 500 to 600 words in Shakespeare
which may justly be called obsolete), there are many
we should never think of using ourselves. Most of us,
I believe, never use more than 3,000 or 4,000 words,
and we are assured that there are peasants who never
use more than 300 or 400. This does not mean that
thej' would not understand more than that number,
for the Bible which they hear in church contains about
6,000 words;* these they would understand more or
less accurately, though they would never think of us-
ing them.
THE INTENSITY OF SUB-CONSCIOUS STATES |
BY ALFRED BINET.
In this new chapter of our study of the doubling of
consciousness I propose to enter upon an exceedingly
delicate problem, and one that is of the greatest im-
portance to psychology. At the Paris Congress of
Physiological Psychology recently, I raised a discus-
sion upon the subject in question, and for the benefit
of the readers of this review, I now desire again to
set forth the opinion I hold and the experiments I
have instituted ; at the same time profiting by the va-
rious remarks and objections that have been addressed
to me by other physiologists.
The problem that I seek to solve is, to understand
how and why in hysterical patients a division of con-
sciousness takes place. Not to present the question in
too abstract a form, I shall recall to mind a few ex-
periments that once again may better convey the idea
of what this so-called doubling of .consciousness
reall)' is.
We have repeatedly seen that in hysterical anjes-
thesia sensation is preserved and may reappear in a
secondary consciousness, distinct from the principal
consciousness. The observations that we have hitherto
published related to the sense of touch. We showed,
in this way, that an anaesthetic hand, hidden behind a
screen, would take a pen or pair of scissors, which had
been brought into contact with it, and with these
several objects would perform various intelligent move-
ments ; which proved not only that the contact of the
objects in question had been perceived, but that even
their nature and functions had been recognized. To
these observations we are now able to add still others,
which show, that also the sensation of pain may be
preserved. Two subjects I observed revealed in one
half of their bodies a total insensibility to punctures,
pressure, burning,—in short, to the most varied kinds
of painful sensations ; but when we put a lighted
match into the anaesthetic hand, the fingers would
cording to W. T. Adey, The English ofKing Jav
• Testaniems contain 6.000 words.
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draw back from the flame in proportion as the latter
advanced, and would finally relax, allowing the match
to fall to the ground. Pain caused by burning, accord-
ingly, is actually felt in an apparentl}' anaesthetic limb ;
there even existed, it seemed, a certain prevision of
pain and corresponding defensive movements ; yet all
this did not reach the principal consciousness of the
subject ; the sensations and movements of the anaes-
thetic limb, by grouping themselves together, formed a
secondary consciousness, which in its development did
not amalgamate with the main consciousness. I must
add, that, according to my own experience, it is less
easy to impress on the anaesthetic regions a sensation
of pain than a sensation of touch ; with most subjects
the anaesthetic hand which is able to adjust itself in
adaptation to familiar objects, does not seem to feel the
sensation of pain caused by a burning match, and
does not perform any defensive movement to avoid it.
I trust that the details given in regard to the divi-
sion of consciousness in hysterical subjects, will sufBce
to impart a perceptible form to the problem that we
are endeavoring to solve. That problem is, to find out
why sensations provoked in an anaesthetic region do
not reach the principal consciousness of the patient
;
indeed, our wonder is all the greater that the sensa-
tions in question should be perceived by another ego,
and should provoke appropriate movements. In other
words, the question we ask is, what are the psycho-
physiological conditions that determine the formation
of a second consciousness ? Having put the question
before the reader, we shall, for the sake of greater
clearness, at once point out the solution we propose.
It is a matter of observation, as we shall presently
show, that if among sensations belonging to the same
organ of sense, (for example, to touch or to sight,
)
some belong to one consciousness and others to a dif-
ferent consciousness, there will exist among such sen-
sations a difference of intensity. We are unable in
cases of hemi-anaesthesis to demonstrate this fact di-
rectly
; for it is utterly impossible to compare with
one another, from the point of view of intensity, the
tactile sensations of any two, sensible and insen-
sible, parts of a body; because each of the conscious-
nesses knows but one of these two groups of sensa-
tions. We may, however, take a roundabout way,
and resort to an artifice based upon the following fact,
that in cases in which the hysterical patient presents
an approximatively regular hemi-anaesthesis, the or-
gans of sense situated in the insensible half will share
the anaesthesis to a less degree than the skin will ; thus,
the eye may reveal a loss of the perception of cer-
tain colors, or a concentrical contraction of the nor-
mal field of colors. It is, accordingly, possible to in-
stitute comparative experiments upon the sensibility
of the healthy eye, and likewise upon that of the eye
on the anaesthetic side, with the view of ascertaining
whether the sensations caused in both eyes by a same
excitant exhibit differences of quality or of intensity.
The two following experiments seem to furnish an an-
swer to this question.
M. Charpentier has demonstrated, that a minimum
of perceptible color exists, depending upon the extent
of the stimulated part of the retina. The same fact
is verified in the hysterical patient, 5'et on a much ex-
aggerated scale, for in order that an hysterical person
may be able to perceive a color, the colored surface
must be larger than is required for the normal eye.
Now, it is highly important to be able to establish that
the chromatic minimum is not the same for- both eyes.
Let us take an example. To perform the experiments,
it is not necessary to employ pure colors, since the
main fact of importance lies in the comparison of the
two eyes. Thus, in the case of Dem . . . .
,
a hemi-
anassthetical patient on the right side, a piece of red
paper, to be perceived as such by the right anaesthet-
ical eye, had to be at least six millimetres square,
while in the case of the left eye two millimetres square
is a sufficient size. It is thus seen that the quantit}'
of excitation necessary for the production of the sen-
sation of red is not the same for both eyes. This is
not a matter of interpretation, but the actual fact
itself; whence, it appears, we may conclude with a
certain degree of probability, that if to both eyes we
apply one and the same excitant, the sensation pro-
duced on the sensible side will possess a greater in-
tensity than that produced on the anaesthetical side.*
A second experiment, likewise performed upon the
sense of vision, yields a result which, in my opinion,
leads to an analogous interpretation. We know that
when we present simultaneously to each of both eyes
two surfaces representing different colors, there is pro-
voked what is called a conflict, an antagonism of the
visual field. If, for example, we present to the right
eye a red back-ground, and to the left eye a green
one, the observer will perceive a field which seems
alternately red and green. I have attempted to repro-
duce this experiment with hysterical subjects, by em-
ploying certain colored glasses, that have kindly been
lent me by M. Ch. Henry. I have used only glasses
the color of which my patients could perceive with
both eyes. In hemi-anaesthetic hysterical subjects,
submitted to my investigation, I have established the
fact, that there is not produced a concurrence of the
visual fields, as in normal individuals ; the color placed
before the eye of the sensible side is the only one
perceived. If, for example, into the frame of a pair
of spectacles we insert a red glass and a green glass.
*M. Parinaud. directoi of the opthalmoscopic department at the " Sal-
pOtrit-re," has verified tlie same l^ct in a slightly difirerent form, (.\nesthesie
de Ui retine Bruxelles, 1886.)
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which are ahnost complementary and, when super-
posed, extinguish each other, the subject will only
perceive the color of the glass placed before the eye of
greater sensibility ; he thus on!}' perceives red in the
one instance, and green in the other. Like the former
example, this new experiment seems to me to demon-
strate, that, given an equal degree of excitation, the
sensations of the sensible eye will present a greater
intensity than those of the anaesthetic eye.
This conclusion might be further strengthened by
researches that I have recently made with reference to
the times of reaction in visual excitations. The times
are longer when the excitation is performed upon the
anaesthetic eye ; which seems again to prove, that the
sensation of this eye, for any one excitation, is of a
less intensity than that of the sensible eye. M. Fere
has made observations on the times of reaction to tac-
tile excitations, in cases of incomplete anaesthesias of
the skin, and has obtained similar results.
In the researches of which I have just given a con-
densed exposition, we have hitherto compared the
sensations produced in a sensible region and those
produced in an anaesthetic region from the point of
view of intensity only. If the conclusion derived
—
although provisorily—from these first researches is cor-
rect, we ought to be able to generalize it, and to as-
sume in advance, that if we progressively diminish the
intensity of an excitant that acts upon the more sen-
sible organ, there must arrive a point at which the
sensation is sufficiently diminished in intensity as no
longer to form a part of the secondary consciousness,
but become sub-conscious, as are the sensations of the
anaesthetic regions.
And experiments, indeed, completely confirm this
prediction. Here again we are by preference referred
to visual excitants, in order, as far as possible, to
obtain precise and mensurable results.
We have, in fact, already published the experiment
required, in our study of the hysterical eye. (No. 102
of The Open Court.) We have seen, that if we place
an hysterical person before a graduated scale of let-
ters, the writing of the insensible hand, unknovvn to
the subject, is able to reproduce diminutive letters that
the subject himself cannot see. Now, it is easy to es-
tablish here, that a difference of intensity exists between
the sensations forming part of the two consciousnesses.
The word intensity, I well know, has, when applied
to sensations, a rather uncertain sense. But we call
attention to the fact, that the intensity of visual sen-
sation here corresponds to an objective fact, suscep
tible of measurement—the size, namel)', of the retinal
image; and all things being otherwise equal, it is al-
lowable to say, that to the largest retinal image cor-
responds the most intense visual sensation. Now, just
as when we diminish the retinal image—through the
choice of ever smaller letters—a point arrives where
the size of the image becomes insufficient to allow of
reading, but nevertheless is sufficient to determine au-
tomatic writing, it is manifest, that the principal dif-
ference existing in this case between the sensations of
the two consciousnesses, is a difference of intensity.
This second series of experiments reaches, we see,
the same conclusion as the former. We shall pres-
ently expound still others, which belong to an entirely
different order.
Among the most curious and important facts that
have recently been discovered in the domain of phys-
iological psychology, we must mention the phenomena
of dynamogeny, as produced in hyperexcitable sub-
jects under the influence of peripheral excitations,
that is to say, of sensations of every kind. M. Fere,
who long has studied these dynamogenetic actions of
sensations, has demonstrated that they make them-
selves felt not only upon the movements, but upon the
sensibility, upon circulation and the other physiolog-
ical functions.*
These psycho-mechanical experiments can furnish
a fresh argument in support of the thesis we advance ;
showing, that if the sensations we provoke in an
anaesthetic limb, do not reach as far as the principal
consciousness ol the subject, it is caused by lack of
intensit}'. In fact, when we subject the limb or the in-
sensible region to the influence of a djmamogenetic
agent, as a magnet or to electricity, the sensations pro-
voked in this limb become conscious according as the
power of dynamometric pressure is increased ; there
is, accordingly, probably produced the same augmen-
tation of intensity in the psychosensorial process, as
in the psycho-motory process.
If there remained any doubt in regard to the pre-
ceding interpretation, such doubts, I trust, would be
destroyed by the recital of a somewhat complex exper-
iment upon the visual organ, which I have performed
upon several patients, and notably with L. L . Let
us again place this subject before the black-board with
its scale of written letters. The patient's visual acu-
ity, as previously stated, is equal to 0-5 : the visual
acuity, revealed by the automatic writing, is a trifle
higher, it is equal to 075. If, while the subject is at-
tempting to decipher the letters, we subject him to a
dynamogenetic excitation, such as a simple pressure
upon the anaesthetic hand, the visual acuity of the con-
scious subject increases, it becomes equal to 075,
and, consequently, equal to that which guides the au-
tomatic writing. We are able to interpret this first
result by asserting, that peripheral excitation renders
conscious to the principal subject certain visual sen-
sations, in that it augments their intensity.
But the most curious fact that occurs in this ex-
'' Sfitsationet Movement. Paris: Feli< Alcan.
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periment is the following. This same dynamogenetic
excitation exerts its influence upon the visual acuity
that is in connection with the automatic writing. The
measurement of this visual acuity shows even, that it
can become equal to unity, namely, to that of a normal
eye ; the acuity of conscious perception remains less,
and only attains 0-75.
It is really interesting to note, that a given periph-
eral excitation, which suffices to provoke automatic
writing, is not competent to provoke the conscious
perception of the principal ego. In other words, a
degree of sensorial intensity sufficient to provoke au-
tomatic writing, does not suffice to provoke conscious
perception ; which proves once again, that there exists
a difference of intensity between the psychological phe-
nomena of the two consciousnesses.
All the experiments above expounded are sus-
ceptible of a very simple counter-proof. Up to this
point we have seen, that in most cases we are able to
render a sensation sub-conscious, by diminishing the
quantity of excitation, or, inversely, to render a sen-
sation conscious by augmenting the quantity of exci-
tation. We have not operated directly upon the ele-
ment of consciousness.
Hypnotic suggestion enables us to modify this ele-
ment, to suppress it when it exists, or to create it, when
it is lacking. By this means we are able to ascertain
whether the conscious phenomenon corresponds to a
definitely determined degree of intensity of the phys-
iological phenomenon that serves as its foundation.
Upon this point, I have performed, in association with
M. F€t6, an experiment which seems to me decisive.
The experiment in question was conducted with an
hypnotisable, hysterical woman, who when she volun-
tarily pressed the dynamometer in the state of rest in-
dicated on it the number 20, and when she pressed
the instrument while looking at a red-colored surface,
the cipher 40. With this subject an hypnotic sugges-
tion suppresses for a moment the conscious vision of
the red. Again, invited to press the dynamometer,
while looking at the red surface, which to the subject
seems grey, she no longer indicates 40, but a number
slightly higher than her normal figure. This experi-
ment demonstrates to us, that the suppression of con-
sciousness is equivalent to a diminution of intensity in
the corresponding physiological process.
And this conclusion, which we have already reached
a number of times, seems to me to deserve an earnest
consideration
; but, in order to be well understood, it
needs to be made precise. In short, the experiments
that we have recapitulated only seem to prove one
thing, viz. : that a sensation having been given, whether
visual, tactile, auditive or other, if we diminish its in-
tensity, it is no longer perceived by the principal con-
sciousness, but may be discovered in a secondary
consciousness. A difference of intensity, accordingly,
can serve to explain how a tactile sensation a belongs
to the first consciousness, and a tactile sensation fi be-
longs to the second.
But, when the sensations are of a different class,
this comparison of intensity becomes altogether in
sufficient. Thus, there are subjects who will perceive
an electric current in a member where they have lost
the sensation of mechanical pressure, or of puncture,
of heat, or of cold. Evidently we cannot explain this
disassociation by saying that electric sensation is more
intense than other sensations, because frequently the
very subjects that are insensible to the strongest punc-
tures, are able to feel even the faintest galvanic current,
and moreover no standard of comparison is really pos-
sible between things that are so widely different. But
let us call attention to the fact, that if the explanation
we have proposed, encounters at this point a limit,—
a
fact which merely proves that it is not general,—never-
theless, we are able to establish that the notion of
quantity and of intensity maintains its importance,
even in experiments of the kind referred to. There
are, in fact, many hysterical subjects who do not per-
ceive the electrical excitation at the first instant it is
applied to the insensible skin ; but if the excitation is
continued for a few moments, it most frequently hap-
pens that sensibility to the electrical current will be
aroused under the form of a painful sensation ; which
proves beyond question, that a certain quantity of
electrical excitation is needed in order to arouse con-
scious sensation, and that quality is not the paramount
factor.
In conclusion I shall emphasize a psychological
aspect, which appears to me of a certain importance.*
I do not believe that a difference of intensity between
two sensations of the same sense ipso facto justifies
their distribution into two different consciousnesses.
It is further necessary, that the sensation, however
faint, should not possess an interest, a practical im-
portance that might attract the attention of the sub-
ject, and by that very fact augment the intensity of
the sensation in question.
The hysterical subject, as I, with many other ob-
servers, conceive him, is an exhausted subject. The
slightest effort is painful to him, and he thus seeks to
husband his forces. Like all of us, he experiences a
vast number of sensations, differing both in their inten-
sity and quality. He makes a selection from among all
these sensations, because he finds it too fatiguing to
perceive them all. Generally speaking, he more care-
fully preserves visual sensations than tactile sensa-
tions, because he can less easily dispense with the
former ; and in a given order of sensations, he pre-
*M. Pierre Janet, ;. propoB of my coran
liad advanced an opinion which closely agre
the Paris Congr.
ic I set fortli.
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serves the most intense sensations, because the latter
are perceived with the least effort of adaptation of the
sensory organ. Such, in my opinion, is the rather in-
direct role of the intensity of sensation in the division
of consciousness.
It is because feeble sensations are difficult to collect
and to arrange, because they exact greater attention
and greater effort, that the subject neglects them and
that they form secondary' consciousnesses. The divi-
sion of consciousness, it seems to me, is chiefly ex-
plainable by the mental habitudes peculiar to the in-
dividual.
PLEASURE AND PAIN.
K.^NT says somewhere, " Pleasure is the feeling of
the furtherance, pain of the hinderance of life," and
expresses in this sentence an opinion that has been in
vogue among philosophers since time immemorial.
Hut it is strange that neither Kant nor any other thinker
has greatly troubled himself with a careful investiga-
tion of facts. The statement seemed so obvious, so
direct and convincing, that it received almost universal
admittance in philosophy ; and was even employed as
a corner-stone for ethics by Epicurus, Bentham, Spen-
cer, Hoefding, and others.
Alexander Bain in his excellent work "Mind and
Body," quotes Kant's definition and develops his own
as follows (p. 59):
" States of Pleasure are connected with an increase, states of
Pain with an abatement, of some or all of the vital functions.
"'
Bain adds :
"There are, however, a few startling exceptions. For ex-
ample:— Cold may be painful and yet wholesome, as in the cold
bath, and under the keen bracing air. But this exception, on
closer view, confirms the general rule, while rendering its applica-
tion more definite. Cold undoubtedly depresses, for a time, one
very sensitive organ, the skin, perhaps also the digestive organs
;
while, in moderate degree (that is, the degree constituting whole-
someness) it exalts, through the capillary circulation, the lungs, the
heart, the muscles, and the nerves ; and the contrast teaches us
that as far as immediale pleasure is concerned, we lose more by de-
pressing the functions of the skin and the stomach, than we gain
by increasing the power of the heart, the lungs, the muscles, or
even the nerves themselves.
"Another very remarkable exception is the painlessness of
many diseases, together with the occasional absenceof all pain, and
even the presence of great comfort, in the sick bed and in the final
decay of life
'"The connexion of pleasure with vitality, and of pain with
feebleness or loss of function, does not apply to all organs alike
;
some are comparatively insensitive, their degeneracy and decay
seem unaccompanied with feeling ; while in others the smallest
functional derangement is productive of pain. Muscular weakness
does not give pain, unless we are compelled to efforts beyond our
strength ; also the nervous system may be enfeebled as regards
thinking power without producing discomfort, provided we are
allowed perfect repose
'
' Intellectual feebleness, decay of memory, and incapability
of thought, are not painful in themselves
" We often see patients in the last stage of consumption, still
entertaining the most sanguine prospects of recovery ; a proof that,
instead of being mentally depressed, they are in the opposite or
joyous condition "
There is no sufficient explanation for all these ex-
ceptions to Bain's law identifying pleasure with a
growth and pain with a decay of the vital functions.
Bain says that sometimes an acute smart will tempo-
rarily raise the energies ; it will have the effect of a
stimulus. But this explains only a few instances, such
as a cold bath or the influence of keen, bracing air,
and these instances may be used as examples to show
that the cold bath in itself can by repeated indul-
gence and through its wholesome effects become a
pleasure. First it becomes a want and then the satis-
faction of this want itself, even, without taking into
consideration the wholesome after-effect, is felt as
pleasurable.
Mr. Bain does not, and I think he cannot, from his
standpoint, remove the innumerable difficulties aris-
ing from exceptions irreconcilable with his law. The
degeneration of several functions, the decrease of mus-
cular and nervous activity, and even the dissolution
by consumption are by no means always painful pro-
cesses, and yet if anything they are decay, they are
abatement. Certainly, the law is wrong, it is not de-
rived from facts. It is an a-priori statement to which
facts have to be fashioned in order to agree.
Pain is apparently due to a disturbance. We have
for instance a hollow tooth; the nerve is exposed and
the slightest irritation causes most violent pain. There
is neither growth nor decay in the nerve, yet there is
suffering. The decay of the osseous parts took place
without pain. Now we go to the dentist and, supposing
that he is unable to save the nerve, he at once removes
all pain by the aid of a drop of cocaine, or carbolic
acid, or any other drug which causes the nerve to die.
Here is decay without pain. When infants are teeth-
ing, there is growth combined with pain. Whatever
the tooth may feel we do not know ; yet its growth
causes disturbances in the surrounding parts which
are perceived as pains.*
In a state of decay the vital functions are abating.
The lower the vital functions become, the less pleasur-
* Copulation, which is supposed to be a pleasure, is not growth, but a com-
bination merely. .Modern researches by VVeismann and others have shown
that it is a natural want rising from the insufficiency of an individual to pr(y-
pagate itself. Its physiological condition seems to be the divided existence
of the reproductive germ, so that each sex posesses but one part. The con-
tinuance and regeneration of life depend upon the activity of the germ. Thus
the restoration of the germ becomes a necessity and want of self-preservation.
The natural deiire for fecundation (not the other sexual instincts, which
through heredity became strongly connected therewith! is an expression of
the yearning for immortal life.
If growth were a pleasure, then child-bearing in tself. apart from -ts
results should be the hei ^ht of earthly enj jyment which perhaps should be
eclipsed by birth only—birth being growth beyond the limits of an individu .1.
Child-beiring in itself, the growth of a new being, is neither pleasurable nor
painful. It often becomes painful by the many disturbances which it is but too
liable to cause.
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able excitement, but at the same time the less pain
will be possible. Decay far from being identical with
pain is the annihilation of the possibility' of pain.
Pain is caused through perturbation. The more
violent perturbations are, the stronger the pain will
be. There are wholesome and disastrous disturb
ances. Among the wholesome disturbances we count
not only those which arise from growth, but also
such as arouse our energies and indirectly promote
our general welfare, disastrous are such as lead direct-
ly or indirectly to destruction.
Decay is often accompanied with great suffering,
but the suffering is apparently not due to the decay it-
self, but to the struggle of the animal vitality in order
to overcome the decay. The agonies of death are not
caused by death but by life's resistance to death.
The agony is stronger in youths exuberant with vigor^
ous health, than in old men whose vitality is low.
Pleasure and pain are generally conceived like
heat and cold,* as correlatives; and in some respects
they are counterparts ; they are the two extreme poles
of our soul life. But they are unlike heat and cold in
so far as the one is not the same as the other differing
only in degree.
Pleasure is wrongly considered as active, pain as
passive. Prof. Bain attempts to show that pleasurable
emotions display "the general erection of the body,"
while pain "leads to the relaxation of all the extensor
muscles " which, he says, are the most powerful. Yet,
the flexors of the hand which contract in a fit of
anguish, so as to ball the fist, are much stronger mus-
cles than the extensors, and even if that were not the
case. Prof. Bain must and does concede, that there is
" still an active prompting under pain." He cannot,
as he suggests, confine this active prompting to a
relaxation of the flexor- muscles alone, for the cry of in-
tense pain is to a great extent executed by the same
muscles as the shouts of gay hilarity. Pain as well
as pleasure are states of consciousness that accompany
the reactions of the nervous system to certain irrita-
tions. Pain, it appears, is always caused through a
disturbance, (whether this disturbance is good or bad
is here a secondary consideration, ) while pleasure is
the gratification of a want.
There is much confusion shown concerning the
nature of pleasure and pain, if the one is called an
" accession of vital force," the other " a loss or depri-
vation of energy,
"f The different pleasures may be
classed partly as the accessions, partly as a spending
of vital force. Digestion is an accession, bodily ex-
ertion a deprivation of energy. Both are classed to-
gether as the most common pleasures of life. They
are pleasures in so far as both are satisfactions of
Yet pte
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wants. A youth, who is glowing with vitality, has a
natural want of bodily exertion, and a hungry stomach
has a want of food. Take away the want and all that
can be called pleasure in the acts disappears. It
ceases to be a gratification.
It is generally acknowledged that there are pains
which are wholesome, and pleasures which are disas-
trous. This does not prove that decay may sometimes
be wholesome and growth fatal; yet it proves that
some disturbances are good and conductive to our
prosperity, while, on the other hand, some gratifica-
tions of certain wants will be found to be injurious.
The gratification of natural wants cannot, upon
the whole, be considered as injurious; although an
occasional lack of their gratification will often under
favorable circumstances lead to progress. Wants
that are not at all or insufficiently satisfied, prompt the
inventor to invent, and the courageous to discover
new paths that will in the end make possible their
gratification. In the evolution of mankind and in the
history of civilization this factor, perhaps, has been
too little recognized. Ungratified wants are always
disturbances in human life, and the more natural a
want is, the more disagreeably will the disturbance
make itself felt. Every living being has the natural
tendency to gratify its wants, and pleasure may be de-
fined as the feeling that naturally accompanies the
gratification of wants.
Now we must bear in mind that among the many
wunts of living beings there are not only lower and
higher kinds of natural, but also unnatural, wants. The
intensity of a pleasure does not depend upon its being
of a higher or lower kind, but exclusively upon the
intensity of the want.
The lower natural wants are called necessities of
life, and it is noticeable that thej' cease to be intense
pleasures, the more their satisfaction becomes ensured.
The energy necessary for their gratification can thus be
employed for the higher emotional and intellectual
wants. Unnatural wants are the result of unnatural
habits, but we can observe that their gratification is
just in the same measure as in other cases pleasurable
to the degree of intensity of the want.
It would be impossible to draw an exact line be-
tween natural and unnatural wants, although tliere
are some about which there can be no doubt where to
classify them. The truth is that there is a large
group of indifferent habits which are not injurious.
They may be considered by one who is accustomed to
them, as natural, by another, who has never practiced
them, as ridiculously unnatural. Thus the smoking of
a cigar, the drinking of a glass of wine, may be to one
an intense pleasure, while to the other it appears as
an abomination. The performance of certain actions
may be an enjoyment for one and a veritable torture
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to another. There are men who love their trades or
their professions, others who abhor them. There are
women who delight in attending to their household-
affairs, while others loathe the work.
Pleasure and pain are unavoidable so long as life
means growth. Every progress causes disturbances
whith must be readjusted. A state of perfect adap-
tation, of which Mr. Spencer speaks, is a dream which
is not realizable, unless we dam life's great stream in
order to convert it into a stagnant lake. But if we
succeeded in that, we would be sure to produce worse
evils and more disagreeable pains than all the happi-
ness would be worth, which could possibly result from
such a state of perfect adaptation.
Professor Bain says: "Inasmuch as we follow
pleasure and avoid pain, if pleasure were injurious
and pain wholesome, we should soon incur entire
shipwreck of our vitality," but he finds it necessary to
add, "as we often partially do, through certain tend-
encies that are exceptional to the general law." Do
not, indeed, most shipwrecks in life occur because
people indeliberately follow pleasure and avoid pain ?
And is it not for that reason that we have to preach
morals ? Some ethical philosophers attempt to base
their morals upon the pursuit of pleasure and the
avoidance of pain; but they start from the wrong
supposition that pleasure is a furtherance, and pain
an abatement of life. If pleasure and pain cannot be
considered as a furtherance and an abatement of life,
they can still less be identified with morality and im-
morality. It is true that the performance of moral
acts should become a want of our nature, and in that
case they would naturally become pleasures to us.
But, so long as they are not yet natural wants, we
must, nevertheless, follow the commands of right con-
duct. We certainly shall have a very questionable
guide, should we follow our feeling of pleasure and pain
in determining what is right conduct. Yet we should
unhesitatingly obey the behests of our conscience,*
without regard to pleasure and pain. i>. c.
THE MEANING OF DEATH.f
BY PROFESSOR GAULE.
Everything that comes into being, comes but to
perish ; death is inevitable. The consciousness of
this has taught us well to prune our hopes and wishes,
and to make our plans in this respect for short duration
only. But the discerning eye of science has discovered
that in the true sense of the word there is no death.
* I here hesitated whether to use the word " conscientfe " or " reason." I
preferred the more popular expression " conscience," although it is so often
employed by modern theologians in a mystical sense. The Apostle Paul cer-
tainly uses the word in the sense of " a reasoning upon right or wrong con-
duct." Speaking of the conscien:e of the heathen he characterises it as
their thoughts, 7vOyLCjl6l^ accusing and excusing one another."
t From a lecture held at Zurich. Translated from the Freidenker by
What we call death, is but the separation of the
two individual principles of which we are composed.
Take the Bacteria. After a short period of existence
we see an individual divide. In its place, two new
individuals of the same form appear, which continue
the life of the original individual. No cessation of life
has here taken place ; we seek for the corpse in vain.
Assuming the universal presence of proper nutriment,
the division and subdivision of these Bacteria would
continue without end, until the little rod-shaped
creatures finally filled the whole world. But since
proper and sufficient nutriment is oftentimes lacking,
and since obstacles are constantly set in the way of
such a wide extension of animalcular existence, death,
under these conditions likewise, enters. Yet it has
wholly the chardCter of accident. •
Now, every living creature starts from a germ—
a
definite mass of active, effective substance. The germ
springs from other living creatures and contains the
substance in which the latter are united with one an-
other. The Bacterium builds from the dissolved nu-
triment that nourishes it, substances like itself; and its
bodily increase is brought about by the action of ever}'
single part of its organization upon the alimental solu-
tion surrounding it and the conversion of that solution
into component parts of its own life. After these
changes have continued for a while, the substance
stands in need of reorganization.
* *
In the fertilized chicken-egg the greater part of the
contents of the egg constitutes nutriment for the
minute germ. The two active germinal substances are
the germ-nucleus and the germ plasm ; the two are
chemically different. The germ-substances act upon
the food-substance, chemical changes set in, and the
materials forming the yolk unite with the germ sub-
stances. The latter, however, would soon give out,
were they not constantly regenerated. But every cell
manufactures germ-nucleus and germ-plasm ; thus
alone can the chicken build itself up, and grow larger
and larger; and life cannot be extinguished, because
the organization of the germ-substance is being con-
tinually replenished.
These processes determine the organization of
definite forms in living beings, and consequently have
not merely a chemical, but also a morphological char-
acter. We ourselves bear these two morphological
principles within us, one of which uses up the germ-
substance, and the other replenishes it. Both prin-
ciples are engaged in unceasing conflict ; the first ever
seeking to draw to itself and to retain the germ-sub-
stance supplied by the other, in order to be able to pre-
pare the way for the coming generation. It acquires,
too, by growth, in this continuous struggle, a certain
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advantage over the second principle ; but as soon as
the stage of puberty arises, its death is sealed. Thence
originates the limited duration of individual life.
We may say, indeed, that we are composed of a
principle of the present, and of a principle that pre-
pares for the future ; the one face of our Janus-head is
turned to the present, the other directs its glance to
the future. The antagonistic interests of the two
powers lead to long and hard battles, and are the cause
that our life is so divided.
But what a fund of consolation lies in the knowl-
edge thus gained for us ! After all it is merely the
individual that dies, and die it must that the species
be preserved. We therefore become reconciled with
death, for through death we are enabled to behold life,
first, in ourselves and, then, in our children, in whom
the type of the race reappears in its puritj', having
herein reverted to the original mould.
IN REPLY TO CRITICISMS OF
PROBLEMS."
FUNDAMENTAL
THE MODESTY OF AGNOSTICISM.
It is always easier to scold than to reason. Accordingly it is
a general rule that if a reviewer cannot, or if he does not care to,
answer an argument, he commences to rail at the author whom he
dissects. An Agnostic reviewer in the Aiiwrican Hebj-ew Stand
ard says of "Fundamental Problems": "Nowhere in this book
' is the modest reserve of the true man of science visible. We
' have not the truly liberal spirit of the English school of nat-
' ural philosophers, the spirit of a Newton, or a Darwin, or a
'Spsnc^r, but the harsh self-assertion of the German school of
' metaphysicians, of a Hegel, or an Oken, or a Haeckel."
The honor of being labeled as a metaphysician, I must decline,
and if the reviewer had been considerate enough to read the article
on metaphysics, p. 74, he would most likely have avoided that term.
But why is " the truly liberal spirit " missing, why must " the
arrogance of this author's style" be condemned ? My reviewer
says; " In his insistence upon the value of form, and of formal
" knowledge, the author is standing upon firm ground. But when
" he attempts to discredit the doctrine of ' the unknowable,' by in-
" sisting upon that of 'Absolute Being,' [here we do not know
"what our critic means,] he simply does not know what he is
" talking about."
Is it not strange that Agnostics usually retreat into the re-
doubt of modesty ? Modesty is made an argument of their dogma.
We declare that everything that exists, must exist somehow ; it
must manifest its existence in some way. And this manifestation
can be represented in the mind. We can become aware of it. Ac-
cordingly it is knowable. Existence, that does not manifest its
existence somehow, is no existence. Absolute existence is equiv-
alent to non-existence. Real existence is real by manifesting
itself. Therefore existence is always knowable.*
To know the different facts of reality, to be aware of them,
and to state them is not sufficient. We must try to understand
them. The comprehension of facts is their methodical arrange-
ment. The comprehension of facts is the object of the different
sciences, and their ultimate unification in one great system is the
object of philosophy. We are answered : " ' The Power that the
" Universe manifests to us,' may be scrutable to Dr. Paul Cams,
"but to all less gifted mortals it remains as it was to Moses,* as it
*For details the reader is referred 10 llie work itself.
" is to Mr. Spencer, 'inscrutable'—something that ' no man can
" see and live.' "
Now I think that we see the power that the universe mani-
fests to us daily, and yet we live Yes, we live in it and by it.
We experience it in every throb of our heart and in every vibra-
tion of our brain. If my critic believes that in my insisting upon
the value of form and of formal knowledge, I am standing upon
firm ground, how can he object to my abandoning the agnostic
view of the unknowable ? Is it not form and the irrefragable laws
of form that make it possible, and more so that make it una-
voidable that the world throughout is cognizable ? The regularity
that arises from the laws of form affords us the key to the prob-
lems of nature.
Agnosticism appears at first sig^t as an expression of most
laudable modesty. Who can blame a man for openly acknowledg-
ing his ignorance and who can doubt his sincerity ? Socrates has
been much admired for his confession, ' I know that I do not
know anything ! ' Bat the agnostic outdoes Socratic wisdom and
forefeits all claim to modesty by declaring that no one else can
know anything about the mysteries which he himself cannot ex-
plain. By changing the unknown into the unknowable, the ag-
nostic turns modesty into arrogance
Let me mention here that the terms liberalism and tolerance
are often misunderstood or misapplied. Tolerance means the re-
cognition of other people's right to express their opinion. It means
that a man who has an opinion and expresses it, should not be put
down with violence, nor should he be cried down with harsh words ;
he must not be called arrogant, because his opinion differs from
ours. Tolerance demands that he should be heard, and if he be
wrong, should be answered with good and sufficient reasons.
'
' Truly liberal spirit " does not at all demand that all opinions must
be considered as of equal value, nor does it oblige us to with-
hold our opinion in " modest reserve."
Critics can show their truly liberal spirit, by freely criticizing
that which they consider as false ; they can show their tolerance by
explaining why they disagree with the author criticized. Our
agnostic critic might have shown both by informing us what, accord-
ing to bis view, knowledge means. Before anybody declares that
the whole world is unknowable, he should first lay down a clear
definition of "knowable." Schopenhauer said that "physically
everything, and metaphysically nothing is understandable." Very
well ! My definition of understanding is that of a physical under-
standing ; and I count the conception of a metaphysical under-
standing which, from its very nature can never be understood,
among the superstitions of science. We can easily dispense with
such knowledge as \s per se impossible, and with absolute or meta-
physical knowledge, for what it means no one knows. If ag-
nosticism merely meant that metaphysical knowledge is an impos-
sibility, there would be no quarrel.
.\ philosophy which starts from the positive data of experience,
and arranges them in the system of a monistic conception of the
world, will meet with many great problems and in solving them
will again and again be confronted with new problems. It will
always grapple with something that is not yet known. The un-
known seems to expand before us like an infinite ocean upon which
the ship of knowledge advances. But the unknown constantly
changes into the known. We shall find no real unknowable where-
ever we proceed. The idea of the unknowable is like the horizon
—an optic illusion. The more we advance, the farther it recedes.
The unknowable is no reality ; the unknowable can nowhere pre-
vent knowledge nor can the horizon debar a ship in her voyage,
from further progress.
K witty paper contained a few weeks ago a remark to the pur-
*Itis an original idea to claim Moses as an Agnostic. Moses's doctrine
was certainly not Agnosticism and the holy legend that he conld not see God
face to face admits of other interpretations.
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port, that " he who solves nature's problems is a scientist, but he
" who declares them to be insolvable is a philosopher." This was
sai.1 in jest, but the agnostic is in earnest and when a man pro-
pounds another and a positive view of philosophy, declaring, not
that all philosophical problems are solved, but that they are solv-
able, he is arraigned for arrogance. •
If philosophy is to be called the conviction that the world is
inscrutable, let us abandon philosophy and in its stead let us ar-
range the knowledge which scientific researches yield us, into a
unitary harmonious conception of the universe—call it what you
will ! P. c.
SONNET.
BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.
How TO be envied is the lot of those
Whose placid minds forever calmly soar
Above the troubled world ; who can ignore
The anguish of the present in its throes.
To follow still where idle fancy goes
;
Or, undisturbed, with rapt attent explore
The labyrinth of past, or con the lore
That nature's depths from transient eye enclose !
Such is not mine, alas ! My cherished theme
Has been begun and left a thousand times.
And noisy rumors make my thoughts to seem
Like timid birds that seldom-ceasing chimes
Frighten from where they still return to teem
On some cathedral spire, that into heaven climbs.
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THE PARTING.*
BY MARY MORGAN (gOWAN LEA).
The yellow forest shiverF,
And falls the withered leaf
;
Alas, that what is lovely
Should have a life so brief !
The tree-tops coldly glisten
Beneath a sickly light
—
The Summers farewell kisses
Before she taketh flight.
I feel that I am weeping
My very heart away
;
This pensive scene recalleth
Our dreaded parting-day.
Aware that thou wert dying,
I left in saddest mood :
I was the going Summer,
And thou the fading Wood !
BOOK NOTICES.
Mother's Portfolio. A Book for every Mother ; containing
Messages from Froebel and the Kindergarten for the benefit
of the little folks. Illustrated. By Cora L. Slock/iaiii and Etiii/v
.4. A'c'/logg. Chicago : Alice B. Stockham & Co.
This compilation constitutes a volume of between four and
five hundred pages. It comprises much information concerning
nursery and kindergarten occupations, contains papers from lead-
ing educators (among whom may be mentioned Emily A. Kellogg,
Cora L Stockham, Mary B. Willard, Alice H. Putnam, Harriet
Prescott Spofford, and Florence Pine Bebb), stories (by R. L.
Stevenson, Andersen, G. MacDonald, and others), music, and
typical lessons adapted to the home and the kindergarten. It may
be regarded as a popular and practical encyclopedia of kinder-
garten literature and methods. Clearly and simply written, it is
eminently adapted, as its title implies is its purpose, for use in the
nursery. It will make a very appropriate Christmas present.
We have received from Lord Queensberry a copy of a poem,
" The Spirit of the Matterhorn—" dedicated to the Peers of Scot--
land. Lord Queensberry was deprived, in 1S80, of his seat in the
House of Lords. The ground of rejection was, that Lord Queens-
berry had previously e.xpressed opinions in antagonism to the
Christian Religion, and had publicly denied the existence of God.
In refutation of these charges the pamphlet before us is written.
Lord Queensberry objects to giving a name, such as God, to a
power which to him seems undefinable by man ; he prefers to call
it the Supreme, the Inscrutable. The soul, he holds, is not an
essence distinct from the body : it is //;< ncliiul rt'siill of llu- hody
itself. Man, therefore, is liiinsilf responsible for the souls of pos-
terity : he may improve, he may debase. The transmission and
consequent preservation of what he possesses and has acquired is
immortality. With this thesis we agree. But Lord Queens-
berry believes, with Spencer, that the ultimate aim of pro-
gress is universal happiness, the perfectibility of man—man's com-
plete adaptation, socially, morally, and physically, to his surround
ings ; this is the goal of all striving and of all aspiration. Just this
perfectibility it is that, we must insist, is in direct logical con-
tradiction to the process relied upon to attain it ; change is the
condition of all life
;
its action is either progressive or regressive
;
and it is impossible to conceive a stage of existence resting secure
upon a foundation that is contrary to the conditions through which
it is attained. (Cf. p. 1989 of The Open Court.) Progress and
evolution are the laws of life. (Watts & Co., London.)
A little brochure, by R. Bithell, Ph D., has recently been
issued by Messrs. Watts & Co., of London, entitled " The Wor-
ship of the Unknowable." Dr. Bithell correctly defines worship,
the recognition of worth ; its elements are meditation, awe, won-
der, veneration ; and all culminates in aspiration and in prayer.
But every human conception of God, —everything that has hith-
erto formed an object of worship,—has given way before science
and hence become unworshipable ; only the Unknowable remains,
only the Unknowable is secure against deposition, for that can
never be relegated to Science. And why ? because it is not, and
cannot be, an object of cogni/ioii. We have too often pointed out
the fallacy of an existence which is not existence. However, we
could earnesily wish, that wherever existence not capable of be-
coming the object of cognition is spoken of, cognition and its
meaning be explicitly defined.
The opening anicle of Tiie Unitarian A'e:ue:o for December,
is by Francis E. .\bbot— " Scientific Theology the Ground of all
Liberal Religion." For an able metaphysical refutation of the
ground upon which Agnosticism rests, we refer our readers to Mr.
Abbot's paper. In the same review, Mrs. Celia Parker Woolley
writes upon the " Effects of the Higher Education of Woman on
her Religious Belief."
With the first number of the coming year, a new department
will be added to Scri/mer's Magazitie. It will be devoted to the brief
consideration of matters of literary and artistic interest and to
short causeries of the type that the "End Paper" has com-
monly represented. The promised addition will supply a feature
that we have always felt the need of in this excellent periodical.
NOTES.
At the conclusion of the series of contributions by Prof. Max
Miiller, begun in this number. The Open Court will publish an
essay by Ludwig Noire, the late distinguished German philologist,
upon a related topic.
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JUST PUBLISHED!
Fundamental Problems.
The Method of Philosophy as a
Systematic Arrangement of
Knowledge.
By Dr. PAUL CARUS.
Price, One Dollar.
To Subscribers of The Open Court, 75 Cents.
No Agnosticism but Positive Science,
No Mysticism but Clear Thought,
Neither Supernaturalism nor Materialism,
But a Unitary Conception 0/ the World,
No Dogma but Religion,
No Creed but Faith.
PRESS NOTICES.
" Le lecteur ne sera pas dispense de voir les de-
tails et de lire I'ceu
sophig.
elle -Revue Philo-
Mjog lj6slega eg greinilega ritud b6k um heim-
speki " ("A philosophical work, written with great
clearness and lucidity.") - ThJAdilf, Reykjavik,
Iceland.
" Ein ernstes, von wissenschaftlichem, weitden-
kendem Geist diktirtes yN<ix\y—Deutsche Zeitung.
"We have studied these essays with inuch in-
terest, and can recommend them to minds not
easily daunted from the analysis of difficult prob-
lems in mental science. A reverent and healthy
tone prevails throughout."
—
Inquirer, London.
" Dr. Cams brings a thorough acquaintance with
both science and philosophy, and to the pams tak-
ing German habit of thought, he has been able to
add the power to express himself in a simple and
clear English that might well be a model to many
Americans "--Opinioii-Outlao/c, Des Moines, la.
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NEW PUBLICATION.
THE
Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms
IN Experimental Psychology
By ALFRED BINET.
Translated from the French with the Sanction ol
the Author. Treating of the following subjects :
1. Tke Psychology of the CV//—Introductory.
2. The Stmctural and Physiological Character oj
Proto-OrganistHs : the Motory and Sensory Organs.
3. The Psychology 0/ Nutrition : Holophytic, Sap-
rophytic, and Animal Nutrition : Predatory Habiti
0/ Certain Animalcula.
4. Colonies 0/ Unicellular Organisms.
5. Fecundation of Proto-Organisms.
6. Fecundation ofHigher Animals and Plants.
7. The Physiological Function of tke Nucleus.
8. Correspondence between Alfred Binet and Ch
Richet {Professor of Physiology in the Faculty oj
Medicine at Paris) respecting Cellular Psychology.
* * * " In putting forth so early after its appear-
ance in French this careful translation of M.
Binet's study of ' The Psychic Life of Micro-Organ-
istns,' the Open Court Pub. Co. has shown at once
enterprise and discrimination." * * * Mind.
* * " The little book will be no less than fasci-
nating to all who are interested in the subject of
comparative psychology." * * * Boston Beacon.
* * * "We recommend the book to all earnest
students of the great problems of evolution, as be-
ing unexcelled in the representation of modern bi-
ological investigations." * * * Reformed Quarterly
Review.
* * * "The book will repay perusal." *** N. }'.
Medical Abstract.
* # * "A very remarkable book." + * Health
and Home.
lb mo, 135 pages. Cloth, js Cts, Paper, jo Cts.
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Editor and Publisher
.
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The Academy, Syracuse. N. Y. :—We have before
us the first four numbers of this new magazine,
and feel justified in indorsing the favorable opin-
ion expressed by the daily press and some of our
leading college professors of German On the
whole, Germania is well adapted to the private
study of German, and, we are sure, will be wel-
comed by teachers as a pleasant companion to the
usual text-books. Even at the present rates for sin-
gle copies teachers will find in its columns varied
and interesting reading for their classes, at a rea-
sonable rate. We urge all teachers of German to
examine the magazine with this object in view
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